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Abstract
Inconsistency toleration is the phenomenon of working with inconsistent
information without threatening one’s rationality. Here I address the role
that ignorance plays for the tolerance of contradictions in the empirical
sciences. In particular, I contend that there are two types of ignorance
that, when present, can make epistemic agents to be rationally inclined to
tolerate a contradiction. The first is factual ignorance, understood as tem-
porary undecidability of the truth values of the conflicting propositions.
The second is what I call “ignorance of theoretical structure”, which is
lack of knowledge of relevant inference patterns within a specific theory.
I argue that these two types of ignorance can be explanatory of the sci-
entists’ rational disposition to be tolerant towards contradictions, and I
illustrate this with a case study from neutrino physics.
Keywords— Inconsistency toleration, factual ignorance, ignorance of the-
oretical structure, measurement of solar neutrinos’ flux.
1 Introduction
A contradiction is a pair of propositions where one is a negation of the other. A
set of propositions is trivial if every proposition is derivable from it. According
to the Principle of Explosion, any set of propositions, if closed under classical
logic or any other explosive logic, is trivial if containing a contradiction. Given
the role that classical logic has played in the development and conceptual foun-
dations of science and philosophy through time, it is not surprising that scientists
and philosophers have regarded contradictions as extremely malignant.
There is a recurring view in the traditional literature of logic and philosophy
of science which holds that the use of inconsistent information in the sciences
entails the irrationality of the scientists. If assuming the basic principles of
classical logic (or any other explosive logic), “an inconsistent theory implies any
conceivable observational prediction as well as its negation and thus tells us
nothing about the world” (Hempel, 2000: 79). Therefore, any scientist who
consciously trusts such a theory must be irrational.
Pace these traditional intuitions, in recent decades, philosophers and histo-
rians of science have noticed that, at some point in their development, most
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scientific theories were thought to be inconsistent or falsified or incompatible
with the best theories from other domains. Scientists kept working with such
theories nonetheless. Some of the most famous examples of this are: Aristotle’s
theory of motion, the early calculus, Bohr’s theory of the atom and Classical
Electrodynamics, among others. This has given the impression that contradic-
tions are not as malign as they were initially portrayed. Sometimes, contradic-
tions can be tolerated and scientists can safely trust two mutually inconsistent
statements.
The tolerant attitude towards contradictions is called “inconsistency toler-
ation” and it is practiced when agents reason sensibly from inconsistent infor-
mation without threatening their rationality. Inconsistency toleration is often
seen as the result of combining the scientists’ ignorance with the use of special
inferential mechanisms that preserve sensible reasoning in inconsistent contexts.
The former has been mostly described in terms of “factual ignorance” and the
latter has been explained by appealing to different paraconsistent logics.1 In
sum, in cases of inconsistency toleration, ignorance is the first to occur and it
is followed by the avoidance of logical triviality.
Here I contend that ignorance plays a privileged role for the tolerance of
contradictions in the empirical sciences. I argue that, at least, two types of
ignorance are present when scientists adopt a tolerant attitude towards contra-
dictions in the sciences: factual ignorance and ignorance of theoretical structure.
The plan for the paper goes as follows. In Sec. 2, I discuss the philosophi-
cal explanations that relate inconsistency toleration to ignorance. Later on, in
Sec. 3, I scrutinize the relation between inconsistency toleration and factual
ignorance, and in Sec. 4 I argue that factual ignorance is not sufficiently ex-
planatory of interesting cases of inconsistency toleration, and, more importantly,
that inconsistency toleration might be caused by other type of ignorance, igno-
rance of theoretical structure. In Sec. 5, I present a case study from neutrino
physics that illustrates the role that ignorance of theoretical structure plays
when explaining under which circumstances it is rational to tolerate contradic-
tions in the empirical sciences. In Sec. 6, I explain how to move from factual
ignorance to inconsistency toleration. Finally, Sec. 7 is devoted to drawing some
conclusions on the connections between ignorance and inconsistency toleration.
2 The generic explanation
Once a scientist recognizes a contradiction in a set of relevant information, she
can either reject such a set or keep working with it despite its inconsistency.
If doing the former, she would need to explain why she dismissed any of the
propositions involved −for instance, if it is known that at least one of them
1A logic is paraconsistent if it invalidates the Principle of Explosion and allows the avoid-
ance of logical triviality despite the use of inconsistent information. A logic L is paraconsistent
if the L-closure of some inconsistent premise sets is non-trivial.
Some of the formal resources that resulted from the development of paraconsistent logics
have been used to describe and explain historical episodes that illustrate both the presence of
contradictions in the sciences and the absence of logical triviality.
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is false, mistaken or vague. If choosing the latter, she would need to identify
specific inferential mechanisms that allow her to work with inconsistent infor-
mation and still avoid logical triviality −regardless whether these mechanisms
help her to get rid of the contradiction in the long run. When succeeding at
doing the above, the result is called “inconsistency toleration”.
If inconsistency toleration is a rational practice, philosophers should explain:
(i) under which circumstances scientists would be rationally inclined to tolerate
a contradiction and, (ii) how they could preserve sensible reasoning when using
inconsistent information. Nowadays there is still no common agreement among
philosophers and logicians on which are the best ways to achieve (ii); however,
they have largely agreed on the fact that ignorance plays an important role for
determining when scientists can be rationally inclined to work with inconsistent
information. Here I explore what this consensus consists of.
When explaining (i) philosophers generally appeal to the following:
1. When having two scientific statements that contradict each other, scien-
tists tend to assume that, at least, one of them is false (Laudan, 1977:
56).
2. If scientists are able to distinguish which of the conflicting propositions
should be regarded as false −due to being part of idealizations, fictions,
among others−, then they would be able to explain how they could satis-
factorily work on seemingly false information.
3. However, most of the time, when confronted with an inconsistent set of
information, scientists ignore, at least, which of the mutually contradictory
statements should be regarded as false (cf. Bueno, 1997, 2006; Brown,
1990; Priest, 2002).
4. Once this ignorance is acknowledged, if scientists have no better alterna-
tive to the inconsistent set of propositions, the toleration of the contradic-
tion becomes the only option at hand −such a tolerant attitude towards
contradictions is often seen by scientists as a temporary resource.
Call this the generic explanation.
The morale of this explanation is that inconsistency toleration and igno-
rance are closely intertwined. The common agreement on this connection is
that ignorance plays an important role in motivating scientists to tolerate cer-
tain contradictions, but also, that it is a constitutive element of the temporary
character of such toleration. This comes quite intuitively: if scientists tolerate
a contradiction because they ignore the truth values of the conflicting proposi-
tions, but they are also aware of the negative connotation of inconsistency in
the sciences, this tolerant attitude would change once the relevant information
is acquired and a more (epistemically) virtuous body of information is obtained.
If the relation between inconsistency toleration and ignorance is the one
suggested by the generic explanation, philosophers should still address how sci-
entists reach the point in which, when faced with a contradiction, they recognize
to ignore which of the mutually contradictory propositions is false.
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For the case of the empirical sciences, to respond to this challenge does not
seem difficult. As empirical sciences involve, most of the time, the use of incom-
plete information, it does not come as a surprise that scientific theories lack,
at different points in their development, important epistemic virtues, such as
consistency. Neither should it surprise us that, in the majority of cases, when
scientists are faced with a contradiction, they lack the −either conceptual, ex-
perimental or mathematical− resources for determining which of the conflicting
propositions should be regarded as false, even if they consider that it is im-
possible for both propositions to be true (see Bueno, 2006; Mart´ınez-Ordaz,
2017).
2.1 Some objections
A challenge that the generic explanation might face is the following: given the
commitments to classical logic that this explanation has, ignorance can equally
justify either the rejection or the toleration of a specific contradiction.2 In
addition, inconsistency toleration can be equally seen as an indicator of either
prior ignorance or factual knowledge of true contradictions. This considered,
the connection between ignorance and inconsistency toleration might not be as
legitimate as the generic explanation assumes.
First, if one grants that contradictions are always false (as expressed in 1),
once a scientist identifies a contradiction, she would know immediately that
any set of information that contains it will be false −even if she ignores the
individual values of the conflicting propositions. If this were the case, then she
would be justified to reject such a set. Therefore, because of 1, there is no need
for toleration.
A way to respond to this first objection is to say that rejection is an option
only if there is a consistent alternative for the inconsistent set of information.
In those cases, the most rational decision would be to reject the inconsistent
set and to work only with the consistent alternative. Nonetheless, if there is no
alternative, scientists face the dilemma of either getting rid of both statements
and ending up empty-handed or tolerating the contradiction pro tem –while
acquiring the needed information for solving the conflict. In this case, it is
less rational to leave scientists unarmed than to request them to find ways to
satisfactorily reason with the inconsistent set of information (an argument for
similar scenarios could be found in [Lakatos, 1978: Cap. 1, Sec. 2.b]).3
A resulting extremely well-spread consideration is that, if not having a con-
sistent substitute for the inconsistent set, rejection should not be an option. As
2These commitments to classical logic include, at least, the spirit of bivalence that per-
meates the whole argument and the assumption of contradictions being false (as expressed in
1).
3Lakatos understood, in a very different way from Popper and Hempel, that the role of
contradictions in scientific dynamics is different from simply refuting hypotheses or justifying
a simplistic form of theory rejection. As a matter of fact, not only research programs often
proceed legitimately in an ocean of anomalies, but also to be tolerant towards the presence of
anomalies is a decisive factor of progress in mathematics.
I thank an anonymous referee for giving a better phrasing to my ideas on this point.
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a matter of fact, the most rational decision in these cases is to tolerate the con-
tradiction while, at least, filling up the blanks (see Batens, 1998, 2002; Meheus,
2002; Bueno, 2017).
Second, let’s consider the possibility of contradictions being true: if contra-
dictions are true they can be the object of knowledge. Therefore, ignorance and
inconsistency toleration would not be related at all.
In philosophical logic the possibility of true contradictions has been largely
addressed by a standpoint called “dialetheism”. Dialetheism is the view ac-
cording to which some contradictions are true. Dialetheists might disagree on
both premise 1 of the generic explanation and the temporary character of in-
consistency toleration −specially in the formal sciences. Nonetheless, the main
problem for dialetheism has been to determine which are those exceptional con-
tradictions that can be true. On this issue, even dialetheists agree on the fact
that if true contradictions in the formal sciences are already extremely rare,
they would be even more so in the empirical realm (see Priest, 1998: 423). As
a matter of fact, the majority of contradictions that emerge in the empirical
sciences are not true and this is why they are only temporarily tolerated until
scientists find a consistent alternative (see Priest, 1998, 2002).4 As a result,
even if dialetheism has been very useful for dealing with semantic paradoxes, it
has severely struggled at finding exemplars of true contradictions in the empir-
ical sciences. The morale is that the mere possibility of a specific contradiction
being true is not enough for justifying inconsistency toleration in the empiri-
cal sciences. This considered, true contradictions do not pose a real challenge
against the generic explanation.
Third, according to the generic explanation, if committed to classical intu-
itions (bivalence in particular), one would accept the following: (a) if p is the
case, ¬p cannot be the case and vice versa and (b) always, either p is the case or
¬p is the case. This gives the impression that, if it were possible to determine
the truth value for either p or ¬p, one could immediately infer the truth value
of the other proposition.
In light of this, the reader might challenge the adoption of bivalence in cases
in which scientists face contradictions; however, even if rejecting bivalence, the
profits associated to knowing which of the conflicting propositions is false remain
undeniable. To determine that p is false can allow scientists to either get rid of
it or look for explanations of why such a proposition can be satisfactorily used in
specific contexts despite its falsity −such explanations would often appeal to the
epistemic benefits of using abstractions, idealizations and fictions in the sciences
4The most compelling exemplar of a dialetheistic empirical theory is the Hegelian theory
of motion discussed in [Priest, 1987]. This theory says that, in light of Zeno’s paradoxes,
contradictions are necessary for explaining two important physical phenomena: the nature
of the instant of change and the nature of motion −change of location with respect to time
(Priest, 1987: 165,166).
According to Priest, in this case, contradictions are both explanatory and the best option
that scientists had at hand. However, Boccardi and Mac´ıas-Bustos (2017) have recently argued
that contradictions are dispensable when developing a successful theory of motion and that a
Russellian account, a consistent available alternative, is more explanatory than the Hegelian
theory. Therefore, not even for this exemplar, one should grant contradictions to be true.
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(on this subject see [Pritchard, 2016]). Therefore, as the generic explanation
expresses, to ignore the truth value of each of the conflicting propositions is
vital for the toleration of contradictions in the sciences.
From the outset I want to be clear about the dialectic. None of the philoso-
phers who hold that ignorance does an important work when explaining incon-
sistency toleration would content that ignorance in itself suffices for justifying
the tolerance of contradictions in the sciences. Ignorance is the first to occur
and it justifies the rational inclination for tolerating a specific contradiction,
but once an agent feels inclined to do so, she still has to identify a way to avoid
logical triviality when working with inconsistent information.5
Given the close relation between ignorance and inconsistency toleration, the
study of the types of ignorance present when dealing with contradictions in the
sciences can shed light on the different ways in which scientists can tolerate such
contradictions. My aim in the following section is to deepen into the type of
ignorance that is described by the generic explanation.
3 Factual ignorance and contradictions
When faced with a contradiction, if scientists were aware of which of the conflict-
ing propositions is false, they would be justified for dismissing it immediately.
Nonetheless, if ignoring this, they lack justification for getting rid of any of the
conflicting propositions. In absence of consistent alternatives, the best option
at hand is to tolerate the contradiction −at least, temporarily. This kind of
ignorance is what has been called by epistemologists “factual ignorance”. Here
I discuss how factual ignorance takes place in scenarios of inconsistent science.
3.1 Factual ignorance
I start with some preliminaries.
First, there are two rival accounts of what ignorance could be. “On the first
view, called the ’Standard View’, ignorance is lack or absence of knowledge,
whereas on the second view, called the ’New View’, ignorance is lack or absence
of true belief” (Le Morvan and Peels, 2016: 12) −here I assume the former.
Ignorance understood as the absence of knowledge could be divided into
three subcategories: absence of factual knowledge (lacking knowledge of either
facts or the truth of specific propositions), absence of objectual knowledge (not
knowing a particular object) and absence of procedural knowledge (not knowing
how to do certain tasks).6 As inconsistency toleration is often assumed to be
5I am greatly indebted to Ota´vio Bueno and the referees for helping me to give a better
phrasing to my ideas here.
6In recent years, another type of ignorance has been put forward: absence of answers to
questions, which has been commonly labeled as “erotetic ignorance”. Nonetheless, as this type
of ignorance remains very much unexplored, there is no clarity regarding its status compared
to the other three subcategories; in particular, nowadays there is an open debate on whether
erotetic ignorance reduces to factual ignorance. Here I do not focus on erotetic ignorance;
however, for more detailed analyses on the subject see: [Rescher, 2009], [Nottelmann, 2016]
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motivated by scientists ignoring the truth values of the conflicting propositions,
in the rest of this section, I focus exclusively on factual ignorance.
Factual ignorance can be the result of epistemic agent’s failure at fulfilling
any of the basic conditions for factual knowledge. Namely:
(i) a doxastic condition: S believes that p;
(ii) an alethic condition: p is true;
(iii) a justificatory condition: S believes that p with justifica-
tion;
(iv) a Gettier-proofing condition: S’s justification for believ-
ing that p must withstand Gettier-type counterexamples. (Le
Morvan and Peels, 2016:18).
For the purposes of this paper, I focus exclusively on the factual ignorance that
results from the non-satisfaction of the alethic condition.
The alethic condition can only be satisfied if the content of a specific belief
p is true; nonetheless, there are different ways in which an epistemic agent S
can fail at satisfying this condition. The most common of them are:
– S holds a false belief. S can believe a proposition p without being aware
of p being false and still reason sensibly from it. To believe something false
can only prevent some one from knowing (if truth is a necessary condition
for knowledge), but would not be sufficient for an agent to be irrational.
For instance, in the 19th Century, the French naturalist Fe´lix Archime`de
Pouchet contended that life could be generated from non-related matter;
dust could originate flies and parasitic worms could be generated from
scratch by the human body itself. Despite believing false information, he
was capable of reasoning sensibly when using false data, most of what he
produced cannot be considered knowledge nowadays, but the arguments
that he provided were not aleatory nor irrelevant. This is evidence of him
being both rational and ignorant.7
– S fails at assigning an alethic value to a specific belief. When
believing p, S cannot determine whether p is the case or if she is mistaken.
This type of ignorance is often not caused by the phenomenon itself but
by a temporary lack of resources to test the truth of p.
For example, in the 18th Century, (early) parasitologists could not deter-
mine whether parasitic worms in the human body where generated solely
by previously ingested parasitic worms or by the human body itself. This
and [Peliˇs, 2017].
7At the time, Pouchet was one of the most important supporters of the theory of hetero-
genesis, which was a variation of the theory of spontaneous generation, which contented that
matter is capable of generating living organisms that do not need to be biologically related
to each other, for example, new living organisms came from inanimate objects, such as air.
Nowadays it is well known that this theory is false but in the early 19th Century it was still
a candidate for explaining the origin of life.
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is, they could not decide the truth values of propositions such as pthe pres-
ence of parasitic worms would cease by balancing the various body fluids
in the body of an ill personq. Such a difficulty was not caused by the na-
ture of the phenomenon itself, but by the lack of experimental techniques
that scientists suffered at the moment.
– S’ cognitive limitations prevent her from knowing a particular
fact. S holds a believe p but the fact behind p would be epistemically
inaccessible to agents such as S.
An example of this type of ignorance could be
our knowledge of the universe we inhabit seems fundamentally
restricted by the light-cone, i.e. the vast conical section of the
universe (considered as Minkowski space-time), from which elec-
tromagnetic radiation travelling in vacuum could reach us. Cer-
tainly it seems plausible that there is a fact of the matter con-
cerning the number of DNA molecules in the huge portion of the
Universe outside the light-cone. Even if this fact is unknowable,
certainly we are ignorant of it. (Nottelmann, 2016: 35)
In what follows, I focus on the second type and I explain its connection with
inconsistency toleration.
3.2 Ignorance as undecidability
Going back to inconsistency toleration. When philosophers explain cases of in-
consistency toleration they appeal to a specific type of factual ignorance, namely,
the one caused by the agent’s failure at assigning an alethic value to a specific
proposition. Here, I briefly elaborate on how to understand factual ignorance
for cases of inconsistency toleration.
In this sense, the alethic condition is satisfied if S succeeds at assigning a
unique truth value to p, this is, to determine whether p is true. If the agent
cannot assign values neither to p nor to ¬p, the condition is not satisfied. If not
satisfied this condition, the agent would be unable to reject or accept any of the
two propositions in dispute. When the alethic condition is not satisfied, S can
either retain both statements meanwhile deciding the values of the contradiction
or reject both statements a priori.
One of the worries that the reader might entertain regarding this view is
the following: if characterizing ignorance as the complement of knowledge, the
understanding of ignorance will be strongly (and problematically) tied to a
specific conception of knowledge −which, very likely, would be still extremely
contentious among philosophers.
With the above in mind, I suggest to see this type of factual ignorance to
focus on the connections between ignorance and truth values from a philosophi-
cally (maybe) less contentious point of view. I understand this factual ignorance
as the temporary undecidability of the truth value of a proposition p by an epis-
temic agent S at a specific time T1. This ‘undecidability’ is not necessarily as
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perceived in the literature of logic and philosophy of mathematics –as for the
cases of inconsistent empirical sciences the truth values in question are, in the
long run, likely to be determined.8
The causes of this undecidability might be very diverse. As in the empir-
ical sciences facts are mostly discovered via experimentation, if scientists lack
experimental resources to test their hypotheses and predictions, this can pre-
vent them from knowing whether the relevant propositions are true. In addition,
some phenomena, like eclipses, once predicted, require time to pass before being
tested and therefore, such facts remain ignored for a period of time.
When scientists are unable to assign truth values to two mutually conflicting
hypotheses, this ignorance might lead them to either reject a priori one of the
hypotheses, to get rid of the two of them or to keep working with both meanwhile
discovering which one is false.
Summing up, according to the generic explanation, factual ignorance as tem-
porary undecidability is often enough for making scientists to be rationally in-
clined to tolerate contradictions in the sciences. Furthermore, this ignorance
is explanatory of the temporary character of such tolerant attitude towards
contradictions.
In the following section, I challenge this view by arguing that while factual
ignorance plays an extremely important role for motivating the tolerance of
contradictions in science, what is at stake in cases of inconsistent science is
often a more complex type of factual ignorance, namely, ignorance of theoretical
structure.
4 Ignorance of theoretical structure
On the surface, factual ignorance as temporary undecidability could seem to
be enough for explaining the rational tolerance of contradictions in science.
Nonetheless, even if this impression is correct, philosophers still need to explain
where this factual ignorance comes from.
I contend that, for many cases of inconsistency toleration, temporary un-
decidability is caused by a different type of ignorance, namely, ignorance of
theoretical structure. In order to do so, I proceed as follows. First, I briefly
introduce some conceptual specifications on the structure of scientific theories
and holistic properties of bodies of scientific knowledge. Later on, I characterize
ignorance of theoretical structure and explain how it motivates inconsistency
toleration.
4.1 Scientific theory
Scientific theories are epistemic vehicles that help scientists to filter, order and
relate the varied information that they get about the world in order to pro-
vide accurate descriptions, predictions, and explanations of a specific domain.
8If interested in the connections between this conception of undecidability for statements
from the empirical sciences see [Gutie´rrez-Ramı´rez, 2015: Chap. 1. In Spanish].
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Theories are often considered to be clusters of information which are initially
incomplete but that, in the long run, tend to incorporate new data in order
to improve the picture of the world that they provide. ‘The world’ itself is an
infinitely large source of information, and one “of the most obvious sources of
ignorance is the sheer volume of available factual information. There is so much
out there to be known that any given individual cannot ever begin to make more
than an insignificant fraction of it” (Rescher, 2009: 4).
Let scientific theories to be formulated based on the following set−theoretic
construct: T =<D,Rni > ”where D is a particular domain (a set of objects to
which the theory is supposed to apply) and Ri is a family of n-place relations
holding between the elements of D” (Bueno, 1997: 588). T consists of a set
of substructures (partial structures), < A, A′, ...An >, of the form A =<D,
Rk >k∈K . Where Rk are partial relations,9 so that Rk=< Rk1, Rk2, Rk3 >, and
Rk1, Rk2 and Rk3 are mutually disjoint sets such that:
• Rk1 is the set of n-tuples that (we take to) belong to R,
• Rk2 is the set of n-tuples that (we take) do not belong to R,
• Rk3 is the set of n-tuples for which it is not defined whether belong or not to
R. (Bueno and French, 2011: 858-59).
The domain, D, could be selected and individuated depending on the method-
ological preference of the research program in which the theory is being used
and vary from time to time. The relations, Ri, help to order, classify, and eval-
uate the objects in the domain −and the propositions through which they are
described. The relations between the objects of D are closed under specific logi-
cal consequence relations , allowing and forbidding certain interactions between
them.
An inconsistent theory contains both a sentence s (taken to be, at least,
quasi-true) as well as a sentence ¬s (also taken to be, at least, quasi-true).
it should be noted that quasi-truth is strictly weaker than truth, in
the sense that if a sentence is true, then it is quasi-true, but the
converse doesn’t hold in general. Moreover, if a sentence is quasi-
false, then it is false, but the converse doesn’t hold in general either.
(For further details, see Bueno [2000], and da Costa and French
[2003].) Furthermore, it is also possible that a sentence s is quasi-
true and its negation, ¬s, is quasi-true as well. (Bueno and French,
2011: 860)
This approach to scientific theories is called “Partial Structures approach”,
and it has proved to be extremely handy when explaining and modeling incon-
sistency in the empirical sciences (see Bueno, 1997; da Costa and French, 2003;
Bueno and French, 2011).
9A partial relation Ri over D is a relation that is not necessarily defined for all n-tuples
of elements of D (see da Costa and French 1990: 255).
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The basic idea behind Partial Structures is that science is essentially an
open endeavor and because of that, systematically, scientists work with partial,
conflicting and inconsistent information. Partial structures account for the de-
fective theories that result from scientists working with defective (in particular,
partial) information in their day to day practice, submitting that such theories
are at least partially true with respect to a specific domain. The partial struc-
tures’ characterization of scientific theories leaves room for the ways in which
the partiality of information and ignorance interact in the scientific endeavor
without putting in danger scientific rationality; as a matter of fact, the R3 com-
ponent allows us to address this issue by hosting the elements that have not yet
been determined to be models of the theory.
4.2 Theoretical structure
Scientific theories relate varied types of data and they do so in a very special
way: they follow and preserve privileged inferences that are considered to be
linked to the theory’s predictive and explanatory success. What scientists
really study are not any objects and their properties, but certain
general inference relations or inference patterns (. . . ) What exactly
does speaking of ‘inference relations’ here involve; in particular, what
are the relata: mere sentences (so that we are back to some kind of
formalism?), propositions (leading us beyond formalism after all?),
etc.? (Reck and Price, 2000: 347-48)
According to this view, one of the main tasks of scientific theories is to preserve
and stress particular inference patterns between propositions –and it is expected
that such patterns warrant the success of the theory in different contexts.10
The identification of reliable inference patterns is one of the most important
scientific tasks. To identify inference (logical) strategies for the preservation
of the success within our best theories is closely related to the preservation of
(epistemic) reliability. That said, it is important to state that this does not
imply that scientific theories are structures, but that structures constitute a
useful “‘mode of representation’ and it is important to reiterate that, on my
view, adopting it does not entail that either theories or the structures they put
forward as ‘out there’ in the world should be regarded as inherently set-theoretic
in any way” (French, 2012: 5).
Inference patterns determine largely the type of results that scientists can
get in their day to day use of theories. For instance, there are historical cases
in which the chosen set of patterns restrict the use of conjunction as a reli-
able inference (see Brown and Priest 2004, 2015), or cases where reductio ad
absurdum-type of proofs were regarded as not reliable (see Meheus, 2002).
Now, let a structure be a set of operations and relations between collections of
objects such that, in a certain way, has the epistemic role of facilitating the study
10If pAll P are Qq is derivable from the theory, then to derive pQa q from pPaq is an
inference pattern.
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of the objects contained by the collections. For the case of the empirical sciences,
a structure cannot be “construed as ‘pure’ logico-mathematical structure (see
French, 2007); it was always intended to be understood as theoretically informed
structure” (French, 2012: 7), this is, structures that were constantly informed
by the (empirical) commitments associated to the domain of application of the
theories in question.
Let theoretical structure be the (inferential) structure of empirical scientific
theories.
4.3 Knowledge of theoretical structure
Can scientists come to fully know the theoretical structure of a particular the-
ory? Due to both our cognitive limitations and the complexity of our empirical
theories, this might be just impossible. Yet, this does not mean that scientists
cannot know some important parts of the theoretical structure of their theories.
As a matter of fact, to know certain parts of the theoretical structure of her
theories gives the scientist the capability of knowing which inferences are cor-
rect in a particular context and also why such inferences have certain specific
consequences.
When scientists master specific inference patterns within a particular do-
main, what they gain is a way to structure and follow successfully certain infer-
ences in their day-to-day practice; this is, not only that they can use inferential
rules in an effective way but also that they can explain under which circum-
stances and why certain inferential rules are reliable in a domain of application
of their theory.
Knowledge of theoretical structure is not a simple case of factual knowledge,
as to say that someone knows certain structure does not mean only that that
person knows the truth value of specific propositions. Indeed, to know which
inferences are allowed within a theory can help scientists to determine the truth
value of propositions of the theory, but it can also provide, for example, impor-
tant hints on the logical principles that govern that segment of the theory. So,
while knowledge of a fragment of a theoretical structure allows agents to achieve
knowledge of the truth values of specific propositions that are located in such a
fragment, knowledge of theoretical structure seems to be something deeper.
A clear way to emphasize the differences between a simple case of factual
knowledge and factual knowledge associated to a theoretical structure would be
to describe the way in which these two kinds of knowledge can fail. The impos-
sibility of determining the truth values of certain propositions in the empirical
sciences, could be simply associated, for instance, to a lack of experimental
resources. For example, still in the 19th Century, early parasitologists lacked
experimental methodologies sophisticated enough to test the origin of parasitic
worms, but this was not really caused by the structure of any of the theories
involved nor by the ultimate nature of the phenomenon, but only by a lack of
experimental development.
Nonetheless, sometimes, the scientists’ incapability of determining the truth
value of certain propositions within a theory is caused by their lack of epistemic
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access to the structure of the theory. This can occur if scientists have not figured
out how certain parts of the theory hang together and which are the adequate
inferences that could be ran in that segment of the theory. Such a lack of
information explains why inconsistency toleration tends to last for long periods,
this is until scientists acquire knowledge of the relevant inference patterns of
their theories.
Knowledge of theoretical structure can sometimes get mistaken for the agents’
ability to follow inferences within a theory (a sort of procedural knowledge).
However, while procedural knowledge of inference maneuvers might result from
knowing the theory’s inference patterns, knowledge of theoretical structure is a
sophisticated kind of factual knowledge. Knowledge of theoretical structure is
not only about being competent when using a theory, it is about determining if
certain propositions are true within the theory.
4.4 Ignorance of theoretical structure
If what has been said here is along the right lines, I propose to characterize the
ignorance of theoretical structure in the following way.
Ignorance of theoretical structure: absence of knowledge regarding
the (relevant) inference patterns that scientific theories allow for. When
ignoring (the relevant parts of) the theoretical structure of a theory, sci-
entists are not capable of grasping abstract causal connections between
the propositions of their theory, they can neither identify the logical con-
sequences of the propositions that they are working with nor can explain
under which conditions the truth value of such propositions will be false.
Ignoring the inferential patterns that the theory allows for can prevent scientists
from assigning truth values to some propositions associated to the theory. At
the beginning, this might be mistaken as a case of just temporary undecidability;
yet, if the problem remains for considerable long time, even after the develop-
ment of new experimental and theoretical resources, this ignorance might being
caused by something deeper, namely, ignorance of theoretical structure.
But, what gives rise to ignorance of theoretical structure? This type of
ignorance is often linked to the early stages of scientific theories. It is quite
intuitive that if a theory is too young, and still under development, scientists
will be exploring the inferential patterns that the theory allows for without
having certainty of what constitutes a theorem of the theory. Another possible
cause of this kind of ignorance might be the holistic character of bodies of
scientific knowledge plus lack of epistemic access to the structure of the theory.
If the degree of internal or external holism, is extremely high, scientists would
not be able to identify privileged inferential relations that allow them to test
the truth value of the involved premises, among other things.
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5 Ignoring the theoretical structure of neutrinos
This section is devoted to provide a case study that illustrates the close relation
between ignorance of theoretical structure and inconsistency toleration. In a
nutshell: the following case study describes the way in which neutrino physicists
tolerated a contradiction for almost three decades, mainly because they ignored
the way in which the elements of their theories related to each other −which
prevented them from isolating the contradiction.
5.1 The story
For many years, neutrinos were theoretical entities that help to explain and
predict nuclear reactions -which later would be known as “β-decay”. In 1960,
physicists finally believed that it was possible to design an experiment to prove
the existence of neutrinos –this, through the measuring of the flux of solar
neutrinos.11 In order to do so, physicists combined information from different
disciplines –which included radiochemistry, nuclear physics, astrophysics, and
neutrino physics (Pinch, 1986: 47). With that information put together, physi-
cists were able to come up with what was needed in order to test the existence
of solar neutrinos. On the one hand, John Bahcall designed a mathematical
model that helped to predict the flux of solar neutrinos, this model was named
‘Standard Solar Model’ (henceforth, SSM ) (see Bahcall, 2003: 78).12 On the
other hand, Ray Davis was expected to design an experiment to tests the pre-
dictions of the SSM. The experiment made use of the combination of knowledge
from radiochemistry, neutrino physics, nuclear physics, among other areas of
physics, as well as of complex apparatus and instruments -as a super cooled
underground tank and a Geiger counter.
When, in 1967, Davis did the experiment, the results showed that the SSM ’s
predictions were 2.5 times larger than the results reported by Davis (see Bah-
call, 2003: 79). Davis blamed Bahcall’s calculations, and Bahcall attributed
the conflict to the experiment. Both research groups spend the year of 1968
reviewing and correcting the SSM and the setup for the experiment. After
almost a year, they ran the experiment once again, but the results were not
yet satisfactorily. The difference between the predictions and the observational
results was still large enough to be explained by appealing to a margin of error;
11Solar Neutrinos are subatomic particles that are generated from solar fusion; it was be-
lieved, that this type of particles did have neither electric charge nor mass.
12The SSM is a
theoretical framework derived from the application of laws about energy con-
servation and transport(...) The SSM consists of a set of assumptions both
theoretical and empirical, that -depending on the interpretation of the SSM
that is used- could efficiently describe a unique empirical domain, in this case,
the Sun. It has also the capability of giving descriptions of specific phenomena,
predictions and guidance for experiments on the phenomena it describes, one its
applications is to describe and allow to make predictions regarding the flux of
solar neutrinos. (Mart´ınez-Ordaz, 2017: 133.)
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this made impossible to consider the observational outcome as evidence in favor
of the SSM. The problem remained unsolved until 2001 when it was discovered
that neutrinos are of different types and that they have mass; whit this, it was
clear that to ignore those facts was what originated the anomaly regarding the
measuring of their flux.
Since it was very difficult for the scientific community to point out where
the inconsistency originated –they did not agree for a long time which part of
which theory had to be modified–, it was impossible for them to satisfacto-
rily isolate the problematic part(s) of the theory. But this did not mean that
they stopped using the SSM nor relying on some of the basic assumptions of
the theories involved in the design of the experiment. Indeed, they kept the
theory in use and they continued experimenting with the solar neutrinos phe-
nomena, as the reports from the Kamiokande, the SAGE, the GALLEX, and
SuperKamiokande could show (see Bahcall and Davis Jr., 1976; Bahcall, 1981;
Pinch, 1986; Franklin, 2003). I consider this to be enough to say that scientists
kept using the conflicting assumptions despite the discovery of the inconsistency,
which could only be understood as if they were tolerating the inconsistency.13
There was a common agreement among the involved physicists on the fact
that ignorance played an important role when explaining why it took so long
to resolve the contradiction (see Pinch, 1986), it is not clear that the involved
scientists actually possessed factual ignorance. First, the major problem was
that, at the moment, they ignored many of the inferential relations that the
SSM allowed for as well as many of the inferential relations that connected
the theories that underlie the experimental design. Nonetheless, it was not
clear that they had no epistemic access to the truth value of the majority of
propositions that they considered of interest.
5.2 Explaining the case study
When physicists were dealing with the anomaly in the measuring of the solar
neutrinos’ flux, it was almost impossible for the scientists to identify which
were actually the conflicting statements. While the explicit contradiction was
between the predictions and the observational reports, it was thought that the
actual conflict was located within the theories −the Standard Solar Model,
SSM , and the theory that underlay the experiment.
Take the SSM to be formulated as follows: SSM =<D,Rni >, for which,
(a) D consists on a set of compositional properties of the stars.
(b) Ri is a family of n-place relations holding between the elements of D.
(c) SSM consists of the set substructures (partial structures):
13For a detailed analysis of this particular case study as an exemplar of inconsistency tol-
eration see [Mart´ınez-Ordaz, 2017].
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< ANeuProd, ANeuDetc, AHeliosmg, ARadiatvSp ...A
n >.14
(d) Partial structures are of the form: A= < D, Ri >i ∈ I, for which,D ⊆D
and Ri = Ri ∩D, where:
• RNeuProd1 contains only the elements of DNeuProd which fully sat-
isfy a model of the theory with respect of the production of solar
neutrinos,
• RNeuProd2 contains only the elements of DNeuProd that are known
to not be models of the theory,
• RNeuProd3 contains only the elements which is not yet known whether
they are models of DNeuProd.
The anomaly in the measuring of the solar neutrinos’ flux required to pay
attention to at least four partial structures: ANeuProd, ANeuDetc, ANeuExp and
AEmp.
ANeuProd, contains the SSM elements associated to the production of neu-
trinos.15 ANeuDetc contains the SSM elements which are used for the detection
and measurement of neutrinos −including the assumption that neutrinos were
massless and of just one type. ANeuExp includes the SSM elements used for
the experimental design −the majority of elements contained here were, signifi-
cantly, shared by ANeuProd and ANeuDetc. Finally, AEmp contains the empirical
elements of the SSM .
When the anomaly was discovered, scientists faced the following dilemma:
either to weaken their commitments towards the empirical substructure AEmp
or to weaken their commitments towards ANeuProd, ANeuDetc and ANeuExp.
On the one hand, the first option was ruled out by the SSM ’s success in other
areas of research. As a matter of fact, SSM was considered to be empirically
adequate with respect to the prediction of the age of the stars, the calculations of
luminosity and the presence of heavy metals in the stars, among other domains
of application.
On the other hand, the second option was the most natural to take by the
physicists. From 1968 to the end of the 1990’s, the physicists’ doxastic commit-
ments towards some of the (scrutinized) assumptions of SSM were weakened.
Such assumptions include the information about cross sections of Ar37 and Cl37
(contained in ANeuProd) and the problems linked to the calculation of Coulomb
coefficients (contained in ANeuDetc). The fact that, for long time, scientists
14Which are determined by the domain of application of the theory, for instance: while
ANeuProd is constructed by taking all elements from the SSM that were needed to predict
the production of solar neutrinos, AHeliosmg is build by taking all SSM elements that are
needed for the study of wave oscillations in the stars. These substructures can shared elements
between them but what does large part of the work is that they also have non-shared elements.
15This is, information about the process in which four protons are combined to produce two
protons, two neutrons, two positrons; information about nuclear reactions and cross sections
of elements such as Ar37 and Cl37, among others.
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were agnostic about these facts suggests that, from a partial structures ap-
proach, these elements would be naturally captured by the R3 components −as
their truth value within the theory was still to be determined.
Yet, the scientists’ weakening of their doxastic commitments towards these
facts was not enough to prevent the theory from being inconsistent. As a matter
of fact, despite the commitments that scientists held towards the distinct sets
of information, the conflicting predictions and observational reports were still
reached, this is:
1. SSM :< ANeuProd, ANeuDetc, ANeuExp, AEmp, ..., A
n >
2. ANeuProd  s
3. ANeuDetc  s
4. ANeuExp  s
5. AEmp  ¬s
The above supports two main theses: first, it shows that scientists responded
immediately to the presence of the contradiction by weakening their doxastic
commitments. Second, it also shows that the weakening of the commitments
is not enough for dissolving the contradiction; the theory was still inconsistent
regardless what scientists thought about it, this is why they kept intensively
trying to solve the conflict.
Since 1960, the traditional characterization of neutrinos as massless was
taken to be more an empirical constraint than a theoretical one. Therefore,
this assumption was everywhere, it was shared by all the substructures that
addressed the problems associated to neutrinos’ presence. However, by the
end of the 1990’s, when the hypotheses of neutrinos being of different types as
having mass were seriously considered, these assumptions (included in the three
relevant substructures, ANeuProd, ANeuDetc and ANeuExp, and the empirical
substructure AEmp) were also moved into the R3 components.
By 2015, another strong change hit the theory, the assumptions of neutrinos
being of different types as having mass were seriously considered were discovered
to be true; this had the effect of moving the traditional characterization of
neutrinos (as massless and of just one type) to the R2 components. Finally,
roughly speaking, the characterization of neutrinos provided by Takaaki Kajita
and Arthur B. McDonald in 2015 is now quasi-true in the partial structures
ANeuProd, ANeuDetc, ANeuExp and AEmp. Doing so changed the landscape to
the following:
1. SSM :< ANeuProd, ANeuDetc, ANeuExp, AEmp, ..., A
n >
2. ANeuProd  ¬s,ANeuProd 2 s
3. ANeuDetc  ¬s,ANeuDetc 2 s
4. ANeuExp  ¬s,ANeuExp 2 s
5. AEmp  ¬s
The above does not mean that the theory is finally completed, but that the
SSM is now regarded as empirically adequate with respect of measuring the
solar neutrinos’ flux.
At the moment, physicists ignored how all the different theoretical assump-
tions behind the SSM and the experiment interacted. Given so, when the
anomaly was discovered, they had to choose: either they rejected the SSM and
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the experiment, or they entertained the conflicting theories while attaining a
better understanding of the structure of the theories.
As the involved theories were independently used in other disciplines, it
seemed irrational to lose confidence in them only because neutrino physicists
had not yet achieved full understanding of how such theories related to one an-
other. As a matter of fact, once scientists realized that they ignored the SSM ’s
theoretical structure, they were inclined to tolerate the contradiction pro tem
–until they surpassed their ignorance. Once knowledge of certain parts of the
structure of the theories was achieved, physicists realized that the understanding
of neutrinos required to take as false the hypotheses about neutrinos as mass-
less and neutrinos being of just one type. To understand how these theories
related allowed scientists to adequately determine the truth values of certain
propositions.
This case study showed that, if scientists had sufficient insight of the struc-
ture of a theory, they can be justified for rejecting the conflicting propositions.
This is, if they have known what was causing the contradiction, they could have
cut-off the ill part of the theories without needing to work with an inconsistent
set of information.16 Nonetheless, as they were ignorant of the cause of the
contradiction, they were “forced” to continue reasoning with the theory despite
its inconsistency. This happened because to carry out any satisfactorily revi-
sion of the elements contained in a theory, in order to locate the cause of the
contradiction, requires insight of the theoretical structure, which they clearly
lacked. When such an insight is not available and one is confronted with a
problematic outcome, accepting the inconsistency might sometimes be the only
way to continue practicing any science at all.17
In the next section, I tackle the issue of what else, besides ignorance, is
needed for inconsistency toleration in the empirical sciences.
6 From ignorance to toleration
With the clarifications about factual ignorance in place, I want turn once more
to the phenomenon of inconsistency toleration. I have explained that there are
two types of factual ignorance associated to inconsistency toleration: temporary
undecidability and ignorance of theoretical structure. While the former is often
tied to the temporary lack of (experimental or theoretical) resources, the latter
is absence of knowledge of the inference patterns that the theory allows for. I
am now in a position to explain what it means to move from factual ignorance
to inconsistency toleration.
In what follows, I explain why ignorance of theoretical structure is what con-
nects ignorance to inconsistency toleration. The explanation that I provide here
is ordered chronologically considering the most common way in which scientists
16Such a view is largely defended in [Davey, 2014] and a critical response to it is introduced
in [Mart´ınez-Ordaz, 2017].
17Thanks to the anonymous reviewer who helped me to give a better phrasing of my ideas
on this point.
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go from the discovery of a contradiction to its toleration.
– Ignorance of theoretical structure causes ignorance as temporary
undecidability.
When scientists face a contradiction, if they ignore the truth values of the
mutually conflicting propositions, this ignorance is often caused by the fact
that scientists also ignore the needed inferencial mechanisms to determine
the values of such propositions. That is why, even when equipped with
better experimental and theoretical resources, if the theoretical structure
is still unknown, the contradiction remains unexplained, unsolved and
dangerous.
– Ignorance of theoretical structure motivates the chase for specific
inference patterns.
Scientists “do not simply respond to ignorance by leaving a mere blank.
We have a natural a perfectly reasonable inclination to fill in those gaps
in the easiest, most natural, and sometimes, even most attractive way”
(Rescher, 2009: 2). This is, as factual ignorance alone can never suffice
for justifying either inconsistency toleration or the rejection of the contra-
diction. Some further action is needed.
As a matter of fact, “the ignorant agent rarely (if ever) approaches the
lack of information as a missing content, but she often permeates her cog-
nition with possibilities and hypotheses that build a framework around
that black space in order to justify or explain it” (Arfini, 2019: 28). Such
frameworks can be seen as, at least, the identification, selection and orga-
nization of specific inference patterns that allow scientists to work safely
with inconsistent information. The search of these patterns is motivated
by the scientist’s acknowledgement of her own ignorance regarding the
privileged inferences within her theory −specifically, the inferences that
would allow her to avoid logical triviality and still preserve the most valu-
able consequences of her theory.
– Ignorance of theoretical structure guides the chase for specific
inference patterns.
When ignoring the theoretical structure of an inconsistent set of infor-
mation, there would be different inference patterns to follow in order to
preserve the desirable consequences of the theory and avoid logical trivi-
ality. Such patterns are classified as follows:
There are (A)consistency-preservation strategies and (B) incon-
sistency-toleration strategies(...)(a1) According to compartmen-
talization, domains of inquiry to which mutually inconsistent
scientific theories apply are compartmentalized, with no over-
lap between them, and in this way classical logic is preserved
(...) (a2) According to information restriction, a single domain
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is maintained throughout the sciences, and any resulting incon-
sistency is eliminated by (somehow) extracting conflicting infor-
mation (...) Among the inconsistency-tolerant strategies: (b1)
According to paraconsistent compartmentalization, a plurality
of overlapping domains is allowed for throughout the sciences
(...) (b2) According to dialetheism, all inconsistencies for which
there is good evidence are taken to be part of a single scientific
domain. (Bueno, 2017: 230)
These types of inference patterns often entail different ways of dealing with
ignorance of theoretical structure. Some of them will give rise to scenar-
ios in which an agent has acquired some knowledge about the inferences
that allow her to preserve consistency while still entailing some desirable
consequences of her theory; some others would allow her to discover ways
to preserve some consequences of her theory while losing consistency and
scope of the domain of application.
– Inconsistency toleration is possible if and only if scientists over-
come their ignorance of theoretical structure.
The fact that the selection of particular inference patterns constitutes a
necessary component of inconsistency toleration suggests that, regardless
the cause of factual ignorance in every particular case, inconsistency tol-
eration is evidence of the −at least partial− overcoming of ignorance of
the relevant theoretical structure.18 When a scientist works satisfactorily
with inconsistency, she has acquired knowledge of some relevant parts of
the theoretical structure.
Considering the above, the connection between ignorance of theoretical struc-
ture and inconsistency toleration is illustrated by the following diagram.
18Partial overcoming of ignorance of theoretical structure means that, when tolerating a
contradiction, scientists need not to identify the ultimate or the total structure of their theory,
but that they can provide a set of inference patterns that allow them to successfully use the
theory in question while avoiding logical triviality.
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Figure 1. The general picture: ignorance and inconsistency toleration.
The lowest level of the diagram illustrates what has already been said in Sec.
2: when ignoring the values of the conflicting propositions, scientists can either
abandon the inconsistent set of information and work with a consistent alter-
native (if available), or be inclined to tolerate the contradiction temporarily.19
The middle area shows that, if scientists identify concrete inference patterns
to work with the inconsistent information, depending on the type of inferential
maneuvers that they chose, they can either preserve consistency or tolerate in-
consistency. The highest level shows that, if ignorance of theoretical structure is
(at least, partially) overcome, inconsistency toleration becomes available to the
scientists; and also if inconsistency toleration has been achieved, this indicates
the partial overcoming of ignorance of theoretical structure.
In closing, I want to forestall any misconception, to tolerate a contradiction
does not imply that there is no ignorance involved anymore. As a matter of
fact, inconsistency toleration often shows that some knowledge of theoretical
structure has been achieved, but while such a knowledge might be enough for the
avoidance of logical triviality, it might still remain insufficient for determining
whether p or ¬p are the case in the actual world.
7 Concluding thoughts
Here I explained the relation between inconsistency toleration and different
types of ignorance. I argued that, when scientists find a contradiction in their
19Options such as simple rejection or (dialetheist) acceptance are ruled out for the reasons
discussed in Sec. 2.1.
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theories, if they recognize to be ignorant regarding either the truth values of the
conflicting propositions or the structure of their theories, they can be rationally
inclined to tolerate such a contradiction.
In order to do so, I proceeded as follows: in Sec. 2, I introduced the generic
explanation of the relation between (factual) ignorance and inconsistency tol-
eration. In Sec. 3, I explored different ways to understand and explain the
presence of factual ignorance in the empirical sciences. Here I contended that,
according to a large majority of philosophers, the ignorance that plays a promi-
nent role in the majority of cases of inconsistency toleration is caused by the
non-satisfaction of the alethic condition of knowledge. I characterized such ig-
norance as the (temporary) undecidability of the truth value of a proposition p
by an epistemic agent S.
Later on, in Sec. 4, I discussed a second type of ignorance, namely, ignorance
of theoretical structure. Here I explained the way in which this type of ignorance
is often what causes ignorance as temporary undecidability. Then, in Sec. 5,
I introduced a case study from neutrino physics, which illustrated ignorance of
theoretical structure and the role that it plays for inconsistency toleration in
the empirical sciences. Finally, in Sec. 6, I argued that, ignorance of theoretical
structure accompanies in different senses, as well as at different moments, the
toleration of contradictions in the sciences.
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